In modern cryptography, the secret sharing scheme is an important cryptographic primitive, and it is used in various situations. In this paper, timed-release secret sharing (TR-SS) schemes with information-theoretic security is first studied. TR-SS is a secret sharing scheme with the property that more than a threshold number of participants can reconstruct a secret by using their shares only when the time specified by a dealer has come. Specifically, in this paper we first introduce models and formalization of security for two kinds of TR-SS based on the traditional secret sharing scheme and information-theoretic timed-release security. We also derive tight lower bounds on the sizes of shares, time-signals, and entities' secret-keys required for each TR-SS scheme. In addition, we propose direct constructions for the TR-SS schemes. Each direct construction is optimal in the sense that the construction meets equality in each of our bounds, respectively. As a result, it is shown that timed-release security can be realized without any additional redundancy on the share size.
Introduction
Secret sharing schemes were proposed independently by Shamir [29] and Blakley [4] . In a (k, n)-threshold secret sharing ((k, n)-SS for short) scheme (e.g., see Ref. [29] ), a dealer shares a secret among all participants, and then, k participants can reconstruct the secret while any k−1 participants obtain no information on the secret. Since Shamir and Blakley proposed secret sharing schemes, various research on them have been reported.
On the other hand, "time" is intimately related to our lives. We get up, eat something, do a job, and get sleep at a time of our (or someone's) choice. For the above reason, it appears that cryptographic protocols associated with "time" are useful and meaningful. Actually, as those protocols, timed-release cryptographic protocols introduced in Ref. [25] are well-known.
From the above discussion, it is worth considering a secret sharing scheme with timed-release security. Therefore, we study such a scheme, which we call a timed-release secret sharing (TR-SS) scheme, in this paper. Timed-Release Security. Informally, the goal of timed-release cryptography is to securely send certain information into the future. In timed-release cryptography, the following situation is considered * 1 : A sender can designate the time when receiver's functionality (e.g., decryption) is activated; there exists a timeserver whose role is to generate and distribute some information shikata@ynu.ac.jp associated with time (called time-signals in this paper) periodically; the sender and the time-server (resp., the receiver and the time-server) never communicate with each other. Therefore, the time-server does not need to know when the specified time is. For instance, in timed-release encryption (TRE), a sender transmits a ciphertext so that a receiver can decrypt it when the time specified by the sender has come, and the receiver cannot decrypt it before the time. At the specified time, the receiver can get the plaintext by using the time-signal, which is broadcasted by a time-server, at the specified time.
Timed-release cryptography was first proposed by May [25] in 1993, and after that, Rivest et al. [28] developed it in a systematic and formal way. Since Rivest et al. gave a formal definition of TRE in Ref. [28] , various research on timed-release cryptography including timed-release signatures (e.g., Refs. [16] , [17] ) and timed-release encryption have been done based on computational security. In particular, TRE in the public-key setting has been recently researched on intensively (e.g., Refs. [10] , [12] , [13] ), and Watanabe and Shikata [34] proposed computational secret sharing schemes with timed-release functionality. On the other hand, information-theoretically (or unconditionally) secure timed-release cryptography was proposed by Watanabe et al. [33] . In addition, they investigated not only encryption but also keyagreement and authentication codes with information-theoretic This paper was presented in part at the 1st International Conference on Cryptography and Information Security in Balkans (BalkanCryptSec 2014), Turkey, October 2014 [35] . * 1 As another approach to timed-release functionality, time-lock puzzles [2] , [22] , [25] , [28] are known. However, it is impossible to realize them in information-theoretic security settings since they guarantee timed-release functionality by requiring a receiver to run large computation. Note that in this setting, it is assumed that every entity (in particular, an adversary) has infinite computational power.
c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan timed-release security. To the best of our knowledge, however, there is no paper which reports on the study of secret sharing schemes with information-theoretic timed-release security. Our Contribution. In adding timed-release functionality to secret sharing schemes, we conceive the following two types of schemes.
One is a secret sharing scheme such that a time-signal at the specified time is required whenever a secret is reconstructed, which means a secret sharing scheme with a simple combination of traditional secret sharing functionality and timed-release functionality. For realizing it, we propose (k, n)-TR-SS in this paper. In (k, n)-TR-SS, a dealer can specify positive integers k, n with k ≤ n, where n is the number of participants and k is a threshold value, and future time t ∈ T := {1, 2, . . . , τ} when a secret can be recovered; and the secret can be reconstructed from at least k shares and a time-signal at the specified time t. On the other hand, participants cannot reconstruct the secret without the time-signal even if they can obtain all shares. Specifically, we define a model and security notions of (k, n)-TR-SS, and we derive lower bounds on the sizes of shares, time-signals, and entities' secret keys required for (k, n)-TR-SS. Moreover, we provide a direct construction of (k, n)-TR-SS, which is constructed by using polynomials over finite fields and provably secure in our security definition. In addition, we show that the direct construction meets the lower bounds on the sizes of shares, time-signals, and entities' secret keys with equalities. Therefore, it turns out that our lower bounds are tight, and that the direct construction is optimal.
Another one is a hybrid TR-SS, which means a secret sharing scheme in which traditional secret sharing functionality and timed-release functionality are simultaneously realized. In our hybrid TR-SS, a secret can be reconstructed, if one of the following condition is satisfied: a secret can be reconstructed from k 1 shares and a time-signal at a specified time as in the (k 1 , n)-TR-SS; or a secret can be reconstructed from k 2 shares as in the traditional (k 2 , n)-SS. Hence, we consider two threshold values k 1 , k 2 to define a model of the hybrid TR-SS, and we propose (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS as such a model, where k 1 ≤ k 2 ≤ n. Specifically, in (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS, a dealer can specify future time, and arbitrarily chooses k 1 , k 2 and n. At least k 1 (and less than k 2 ) participants can reconstruct a secret with a time-signal at the specified time, and at least k 2 participants can reconstruct a secret without any time-signal (i.e., they can reconstruct from only their shares). Specifically, we define a model and security notions of (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS, and we derive tight lower bounds on the sizes of shares, time-signals, and entities' secret keys required for (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS. Moreover, we provide a direct constructions of (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS, which is an optimal construction, which meets the above lower bounds with equalities. To achieve its optimality, we use a public parameter, which is needed to reconstruct a secret and to reduce share sizes, in our construction. This technique is reasonable since public parameters are sometimes used in the context of secret sharing schemes such as Ref. [20] .
In particular, a theoretically-interesting point in our results includes that the timed-release security can be realized without any additional redundancy on the share size in both schemes. Related Work. There are many related works, e.g., fully dynamic secret sharing schemes [5] , on-line secret sharing schemes [9] , and secret sharing schemes with disenrollment capability [3] . In a nutshell, in such schemes, a dealer generates and distributes shares securely, and later on, the dealer can generate and publicly broadcast information for changing the shared secret or qualified sets. Our scheme differs from such schemes in that broadcasted information is generated independently of a shared secret (i.e., the broadcasted information can be generated by a third party).
The other type of related works dealing with the concept of time is a proactive secret sharing scheme [18] . In this scheme, broadcast channels among all participants are assumed. Each participant generates and broadcasts updating information to other participants, and then, they refresh their shares by using the updating information. Hence, shares leaked before that time become irrelevant. Namely, proactive secret sharing schemes realize share-updating functionality. In our scheme, such broadcast channels are not assumed and the concept of both schemes is completely different, though both schemes deal with the concept of time.
Further, our scheme is closely related to a compartmented secret sharing scheme [7] , [31] . By considering a time-signal at the specified time as one of shares, we can regard a (k, n)-TR-SS scheme as a secret sharing scheme with a specific general access structure, which is any set of k+1 shares including a time-signal at the specified time. Therefore, we can transform the (k, n)-TR-SS with τ = 1 to the compartmented (k + 1, k, 1, n)-threshold scheme, and vice versa. Generally, in the compartmented (k, k 1 , . . . , k u , n)-threshold scheme, there are disjoint user sets P 1 , . . . , P u , and the access structure consists of sets of at least k shares which each includes at least k i shares from participants of P i . Now, in a (k, n)-TR-SS scheme, we assume two disjoint sets P 1 , P 2 , where P 1 is a set of all users and P 2 is a time-server, and let k 1 := k and k 2 := 1. Then, the scheme can be regarded as an compartmented (k + 1, k, 1, n)-threshold scheme. If the (k, n)-TR-SS scheme is optimal (the optimality will be defined in Section 2.2), then the resulting compartmented (k + 1, k, 1, n)-threshold scheme is also optimal (or also called ideal). Applications of TR-SS. Our TR-SS is a secret sharing scheme with timed-release property, hence we can add timed-release functionality to applications of secret sharing schemes. Here, we consider information-theoretically secure key escrow with limited time span (see Ref. [8] for computationally secure one) as one of applications of TR-SS. In a key escrow scheme, a user sends shares of his secret key using encryption (or other cryptographic protocols) to trusted escrow agents in advance. Even if the user loses his ablity to access encrypted data (e.g., by accidental loss of the secret key), he can get the secret key reconstructed from agents' shares. However, considering the corruption of agents in practice, it is desirable to restrict the agents' power since they can access all encrypted data corresponding to the secret key. To achieve this, a key escrow scheme with limited time span (a.k.a. a time-controlled key escrow scheme) was proposed [8] . In the time-controlled key escrow scheme, a user and escrow agents can update a secret key and its shares at each time-period without any interaction. Therefore, at each time-period t, agents only have the power to access data encrypted at t (i.e., if some agents are corc 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan rupted, they cannot access data encrypted before t). By using TR-SS to generate shares of a secret key, we can realize informationtheoretically secure time-controlled key escrow schemes.
Furthermore, TR-SS can also provide other cryptographic protocols with timed-release functionality. For example, we can construct information-theoretically secure TRE in the two-user setting from (1, 1)-TR-SS and the one-time pad as follows. For a plaintext M and a shared key K, a sender chooses a random number r whose length is equal to the plaintext-length, and computes a ciphertext C := M ⊕ r ⊕ K. Then, the sender specifies future time, and he generates one share from the secret r by (1, 1)-TR-SS. A receiver can compute C ⊕ K = M ⊕ r by using the shared key K in advance, however, he cannot obtain M until the specified time comes since he can get r only after the specified time. In a similar way, it is expected that TR-SS is useful for building other timed-release cryptographic protocols such as timed-release authentication code [33] in the two-user setting, and that TR-SS might be able to provide some new timed-release cryptographic protocols, e.g., timed-release threshold encryption. Organization of This Paper. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we describe (k, n)-TR-SS and (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS, respectively, which are based on the ideas according to Refs. [21] , [29] , [33] . Specifically, in each section, we define a model and security of each scheme, and derive lower bounds on the sizes of shares, time-signals and secret keys required for each scheme, respectively. Furthermore, we propose a direct construction of each scheme, and show it is provably secure and optimal. In Section 4, we discuss some extensions such as TR-SS schemes with general access structures and robust TR-SS schemes. In Section 5, we conclude this paper. Notation. Throughout this paper, we use the following notation. Generally speaking, X indicates a random variable which takes values in X (e.g., A, B, and C are random variables which take values in A, B, and C, respectively). For any finite set Z and arbitrary non-negative integers z 1 , z 2 , let PS(Z, z 1 , z 2 ) := {X ⊂ Z | z 1 ≤ |X| ≤ z 2 } be the family of all subsets of Z whose cardinality is at least z 1 but no more than z 2 .
(k, n)-timed-release Secret Sharing Scheme
In this section, we propose a model and a security definition of (k, n)-TR-SS. In (k, n)-TR-SS, a time-signal at the specified time is always required when a secret is reconstructed. In other words, a secret cannot be reconstructed without a time-signal at the specified time even if there are all shares.
The Model and Security Definition
First, we introduce the model of (k, n)-TR-SS. Unlike traditional secret sharing schemes [4] , [29] , we assume that there is a trusted authority (also called a trusted initializer) T A whose role is to generate and to distribute secret keys of entities. We call this model the trusted initializer model as in Ref. [27] . In (k, n)-TR-SS, there are n + 3 entities, a dealer D, n participants P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n , a time-server T S for broadcasting time-signals at most τ times and a trusted initializer T A, where k, n and τ are positive integers. In this paper, we assume that the identity of each user P i is also denoted by P i .
Informally, (k, n)-TR-SS is executed as follows. First, T A generates secret keys on behalf of D and T S . After distributing these keys via secure channels, T A deletes them in his memory * 2 . Next, D specifies future time, as D wants, when a secret is reconstructed by participants, and he generates n shares from the secret by using his secret key. And, D sends each share and the specified time to each participant, respectively, via secure channels. The time-server T S periodically broadcasts a time-signal which is generated by using his secret key. Note that there is no interaction between T S and D, hence T S may not know when the specified time is. Hence, D has to tell the specified time t to participants when sending shares, and T S has to broadcast timesignals at every time. When the specified time has come, at least k participants can compute the secret by using their shares and the time-signal of the specified time.
Formally, we give the definition of (k, n)-TR-SS as follows. In this model, let P := {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n } be a set of all participants. And also, S is a set of possible secrets with a probability distribution P S , and SK is a set of possible secret keys.
i be the set of possible P i 's shares at the time t ∈ T. Also,
i is a set of possible P i 's shares for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and let
is a set of time-signals at time t, and let T I := τ l=1 T I (l) . Furthermore, for any subset of par-
denotes the set of possible shares held by J. Note that we do not consider a situation where T A determines t in distribution phase since the role of T A is only to generate and distribute secret keys and such a scheme cannot be said to have the timed-release property. * 3 If we consider a situation in which T S is trusted and has functionality of generating keys and distributing them to participants by secure private channels, we can identify T A with T S in the situation. However, there may be a situation in which the roles of T A and T S are quite different (e.g., T A is a provider of secure data storage service and T S is a timesignal broadcasting server). Therefore, we assume two entities T A and T S in our model to capture various situations. * 4 More precisely, there is no need to keep the specified time confidential (D only has to send shares via secure channels).
Definition 1 ((k, n)-TR-SS). A (k, n)-timed-release secret sharing ((k, n)-TR-SS) scheme Π involves n + 3 entities, T A, D
c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan d) Reconstruct. At the specified time t, any set of at least k participants A = {P i1 , . . . , P i j } ∈ PS(P, k, n) can reconstruct the secret s by using their shares u
) and a time-signal ts
(t) at the specified time.
In the above model, we assume that Π meets the following correctness property: If D correctly completes the phase Share and T S correctly completes the phase Extract, then, for all possible i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, t ∈ T , s ∈ S, u (t) i ∈ U i , and ts (t) ∈ T I (t) , it holds that any A ∈ PS(P, k, n) will correctly reconstruct the secret s at the end of phase Reconstruct, namely,
Next, we formalize a security definition of (k, n)-TR-SS based on the idea of the information-theoretic timed-release security [33] and secret sharing schemes (e.g., see Ref. [21] ). In (k, n)-TR-SS, we consider the following two kinds of security. The first kind of security which we consider is basically the same as that of the traditional (k, n)-SS: less than k participants cannot obtain any information on a secret. In addition to this, as the second kind of security we want to require that even at least k participants cannot obtain any information on a secret before the specified time comes (i.e., before a time-signal at the specified time is received), since we consider timed-release security in this paper. Therefore, we formally define secure (k, n)-TR-SS by Shannon entropy as follows (if readers are not familiar to Shannon entropy, see Ref. [14] for the excellent instruction).
Definition 2 (Security of (k, n)-TR-SS). Let Π be a (k, n)-TR-SS scheme. Π is said to be secure if the following conditions are satisfied: (i) For any F ∈ PS(P, 1, k − 1) and any t ∈ T , it holds that H(S
(ii) For any A ∈ PS(P, k, n) and any t ∈ T, it holds that
Intuitively, the meaning of two conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 2 is explained as follows. (i) No information on a secret is obtained by any set of less than k participants, even if they obtain time-signals at all the time; (ii) No information on a secret is obtained by any set of more than k − 1 participants, even if they obtain time-signals at all the time except the specified time * 5 .
Remark 1. We can also consider the following security definition (the condition (iii)) instead of (i): No information on a secret is obtained by collusion of T S and any set of less than k participants, namely, this is defined as follows.
(iii) For any F ∈ PS(P, 1, k − 1) and for any t ∈ T , it holds that
Note that the condition (iii) is stronger than (i). The reason for this is as follows. All time-signals ts
(1) , . . . , ts (τ) can be deterministically generated from sk. Namely, it holds H(S K) ≥ H(T I (1) , . . . , T I (τ) ), and hence H(S | U In this sense, we have formalized the security notion stronger than the security that any set of more than k − 1 participants cannot obtain any information on a secret before the specified time, as is the same approach considered in Ref. [33] . Actually, if we remove T I (t+1) , . . . , T I (τ) from (ii) in Definition 2, we obtain the same lower bounds on sizes of shares, time-signals and secret keys as those in Theorem 1. 
Lower Bounds
In this section, we show lower bounds on sizes of shares, timesignals, and secret keys required for secure (k, n)-TR-SS as follows. Theorem 1. Let Π be any secure (k, n)-TR-SS. Then, for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and for any t ∈ T , we have
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 follows from the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. H(U (t)
i ) ≥ H(S ) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and any t ∈ T . Proof. The proof can be proved in a way similar to the proof in Ref. [21] , Theorem 1. For arbitrary i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we take a subset B i ∈ PS(P \ {P i }, k − 1, k − 1) of participants. Then, for any t ∈ T , we have
where Eq. (1) follows from the correctness of (k, n)-TR-SS and Eq. (2) follows from the condition (i) in Definition 2.
Lemma 2. H(T I
(t) | T I (1) , . .
. , T I (t−1) ) ≥ H(S ) for any t ∈ T . In particular, H(T I (t) ) ≥ H(S ) for any t ∈ T .
Proof. For any A ∈ PS(P, k, n) and any t ∈ T , we have
where Eq. (3) follows from the correctness of (k, n)-TR-SS and Eq. (4) follows from the condition (ii) in Definition 2.
Lemma 3. H(S K) ≥ τH(S ).
Proof. We have
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where the last inequality follows from Lemma 2.
Proof of Theorem 1:
From Lemmas 1-3, the proof of Theorem 1 is completed. As we will see in Section 2.3, the above lower bounds are tight since our construction will meet all the above lower bounds with equalities.
We then define optimality of constructions of (k, n)-TR-SS as follows. 
Definition 3. A construction of secure (k, n)-TR-SS is said to be optimal if it meets equality in every bound of (i)-(iii) in

Direct Construction
We propose a direct construction of (k, n)-TR-SS. In addition, it is shown that our construction is optimal. The detail of our construction of (k, n)-TR-SS Π is given as follows. a) Initialize. Let q be a prime power, where q > max{n, τ}, and let F q be the finite field with q elements. We assume that the identity of each participant P i is encoded as P i ∈ F q \{0}. Also, we assume T = {1, 2, . . . , τ} ⊂ F q \{0} by using appropriate encoding * 6 . First, T A chooses uniformly at random τ numbers r ( j) ( j = 1, . . . , τ) from F q . T A sends a secret key sk := (r (1) , . . . , r (τ) ) to T S and D via secure channels, respectively. b) Share. First, D randomly chooses a secret s ∈ F q according to a distribution P S over F q . Also, D specifies the time t at which participants can reconstruct the secret. Next, D randomly chooses a polynomial f (x) := c
where c (t) is computed by c (t) := s + r (t) and each coefficient a i is randomly and uniformly chosen from F q . Finally, D computes u
. , n) and sends (u (t)
i , t) to P i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) via a secure channel. c) Extract. For sk and time t ∈ T , T S broadcasts t-th key r (t) as a time-signal at time t to all participants via a (authenticated) broadcast channel. d) Reconstruct.
First, a set of at least k participants A = {P i1 , P i2 , . . . , P ik } ∈ PS(P, k, k) computes c (t) by Lagrange interpolation from their k shares:
After receiving ts (t) = r (t) , they can compute and get s = c (t) − r (t) .
The security and optimality of the above construction is stated as follows. * 6 It is enough to just consider an injective mapping P → F q \ {0} as such a coding.
Theorem 2. The resulting (k, n)-TR-SS Π by the above construction is secure and optimal.
Proof. First, we show the proof of (i) in Definition 2. Assume that any k−1 participants F = {P i1 , . . . , P ik−1 } ∈ PS(P, k−1, k−1) try to guess c (t) by using their shares. Note that they know
for j = 1, . . . , k − 1. Thus, they can know the following:
. . . . . . . . . . . .
However, from Eq. (5), they cannot guess at least one element of (c (t) , a 1 , . . . , a k−1 ) with probability larger than 1/q as in Shamir's secret sharing scheme [29] . Therefore,
, T I (1) , . . . , T I (τ) ) = H(S ) for any F ∈ PS(P, 1, k − 1) and any t ∈ T . Next, we show the proof of (ii) in Definition 2. Suppose that all participants try to guess r (t) by using c (t) and time-signals at all the time except the time t, since they obtain c (t) = s + r (t) from their shares. They get τ − 1 time-signals r (1) , . . . ,
However, since each time-signal is chosen uniformly at random from F q , they can guess r (t) only with probability 1/q. By the security of one-time pad, for any A ∈ PS(P, k, n) and for any t ∈ T , we have
Finally, it is straightforward to see that the construction satisfies all the equalities of lower bounds in Theorem 1. Therefore, the above construction is optimal.
(k 1 , k 2 , n)-timed-release Secret Sharing Scheme
In this section, we consider the following problem, "Can we realize traditional secret sharing functionality and timed-release secret sharing functionality simultaneously?". Therefore, we propose (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS, where k 1 and k 2 are threshold values with
can realize timed-release functionality -a secret can be reconstructed from at least k 1 shares and a time-signal at the specified time-and traditional secret sharing functionality -a secret can be also reconstructed from only at least k 2 shares-simultaneously. In the case that k = k 1 = k 2 , (k, k, n)-TR-SS can be considered as the traditional (k, n)-SS (for details, see Remark 3).
Model and Security Definition
In this section, we propose a model and a security definition of 
k, n)-TR-SS (see Definition 1). d) Reconstruct with time-signals. At the specified time t, any set of participants
can reconstruct the secret s by using their shares (u
and a time-signal of the specified time ts (t) .
e) Reconstruct without time-signals. At any time (even before the specified time), any set of participantsÂ = {P i1 , . . . , P i j } ∈ PS(P, k 2 , n) can reconstruct the secret s by using only their shares (u
In the above model, we assume that Θ meets the following correctness properties: ( 1 ) If D correctly completes the phase Share and T S correctly completes the phase Extract, then, for all possible i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, t ∈ T , s ∈ S, u
i , and ts (t) ∈ T I (t) , it holds that any A ∈ PS(P, k 1 , k 2 − 1) will correctly reconstruct the secret s at the end of phase Reconstruct with time-signals, namely,
( 2 ) If D correctly completes the phase Share, then, for all possible i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, t ∈ T , s ∈ S, and u
i , it holds that anyÂ ∈ PS(P, k 2 , n) will correctly reconstruct the secret s at the end of phase Reconstruct without time-signals,
Next, we formalize a security definition of (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS in a similar way to that of (k, n)-TR-SS as follows. Note that the description of (the random variable of) the public parameters is omitted below since existing works using public parameters such as Ref. [20] do not explicitly describe the public parameter in the security definition. Definition 5 (Security of (k 1 
Θ is said to be secure if the following conditions are satisfied: (i) For any F ∈ PS(P, 1, k 1 − 1) and any t ∈ T , it holds that * 7 Although not used in the previous scheme, we here introduce a public parameter pp since we will need it in our construction in Section 3.3.
(ii) For anyF ∈ PS(P, k 1 , k 2 − 1) and any t ∈ T , it holds that
In Definition 5, intuitively, the meaning of (i) is the same as that of (k, n)-TR-SS (Definition 2), and the meaning of the condition (ii) implies that no information on a secret is obtained by any set of at least k 1 but no more than k 2 participants, even if they obtain time-signals at all the time except the specified time. We can also consider a more strong security notion as discussed in (k, n)-TR-SS, however, we do not consider such a strong notion by the same reason as in the case of (k, n)-TR-SS. Remark 3. In the case of k = k 1 = k 2 , the model and security definition of secure (k, k, n)-TR-SS (Definitions 1 and 2) are the same as those of traditional (k, n)-SS. Therefore, the model and security definition of (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS can be regarded as the natural extension of those of traditional secret sharing schemes.
Lower Bounds
In this section, we show lower bounds on sizes of shares, timesignals, and secret keys required for secure (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS as follows. Note that in the proof, there are several technical points which are more complicated than that of Theorem 1. Theorem 3. Let Θ be any secure (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS. Then, for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and for any t ∈ T , we have
Moreover, if the above lower bound holds with equality (i.e., H(U (t) i ) = H(S ) for any i and t), we have
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3 follows from the following lemmas.
Lemma 4. H(U (t)
i ) ≥ H(S ) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and any t ∈ T . Proof. The proof of this lemma can be proved in a way similar to the proof of Lemma 1. For arbitrary i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we take a subset B i ∈ PS(P \ {P i }, k 2 − 1, k 2 − 1) of participants. Then, for any t ∈ T , we have
where Eq. (7) follows from the correctness of (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS and Eq. (8) follows from the condition (ii) in Definition 5.
. , n} and t ∈ T , H(T I
Proof. The statement is true in the case that k 1 = k 2 , since Shannon entropy is non-negative. Therefore, in the following, we assume k 1 < k 2 . For arbitrary i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we take a subset B i ∈ PS(P \ {P i }, k 2 − 1, k 2 − 1) of participants. For any t ∈ T , we have c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 5.
Proof of Theorem 3:
From Lemmas 4-6, the proof of Theorem 3 is completed.
As we will see in Section 3.3, the lower bounds in Theorem 3 are tight since our construction will meet all the above lower bounds with equalities.
We then define optimality of constructions of (
)-TR-SS is said to be optimal if it meets equality in every bound of (i)-(iii) in Theorem 3.
Optimal (but Restricted * 8 ) Construction
We can consider a naive construction based on (k 1 , n)-TR-SS and (k 2 , n)-SS, however, this naive construction is not optimal since the share size is twice as large as the underlying secret size (see Appendix A.1 for details). To achieve an optimal construction, we use the technique in Ref. [20] : In the phase Share, the dealer computes public parameters, and the public parameters are broadcasted to participants or else stored on a publicly accessible authenticated bulletin board. Although we have to disclose k 2 −k 1 elements in a finite field as a public parameter, each share can consist of only one element. In Ref. [20] , Jhanwar and SafaviNaini used this technique for reducing share sizes, and consequently they succeeded in constructing optimal share sizes. We note that although similar techniques that the dealer broadcasts several coefficients of the polynomial such as Refs. [5] , [6] , [23] , [24] are known, the aim of their techniques differs from our aim. Specifically, it is to realize the functionality, whereas our aim is to reduce the share sizes, and consequently, to achieve an optimal construction. The detail of our construction is given as follows. a) Initialize. Let q be a prime power, where q > max{n, τ}, and let F q be the finite field with q elements. We assume that the identity of each participant P i is encoded as P i ∈ F q \{0}. Also, we assume T = {1, 2, . . . , τ} ⊂ F q \{0} by using appropriate encoding. First, T A chooses , which * 8 In this optimal construction, a dealer is only allowed to choose k 1 and i := f (P i ) and a public parameter p Suppose that all participants receive ts
by Lagrange interpolation from (h(P i1 ), . . . , h(P ik 1 )). e) Reconstruct without time-signals. AnyÂ = {P i1 , P i2 , . . . ,
by Lagrange interpolation from their k 2 shares. The security and optimality of the above construction is stated as follows. Theorem 4. The resulting (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS Θ by the above construction is secure. Moreover, it is optimal if k 2 − k 1 = .
Proof. First, we show the proof of (i) in Definition 5. We can prove this as in Shamir's secret sharing scheme [29] . Assume that k 1 − 1 participants F = {P i1 , . . . , P ik 1 −1 } ∈ PS(P, k 1 − 1, k 1 − 1) try to guess s by using their shares, public parameters, and all time-signals. F can compute g(x) from public parameters and the time-signal at the specified time, hence they can get h(P il ) = f (P il ) − g(P il ) (l = 1, . . . , k 1 − 1). Thus, they can know the following:
However, from Eq. (15), they cannot guess at least one element of (a 1 , . . . , a k1−1 ) with probability larger than 1/q. Therefore, from the property of the one-time pad, we have H(S | U (t) F , T I (1) , . . . , T I (τ) ) = H(S ) for any F ∈ PS(P, 1, k 1 − 1) and any t ∈ T . Next, we show the proof of (ii) in Definition 5. Without loss of generality, we suppose that k 2 − k 1 = , and that k 2 − 1 participants try to guess s by using their shares, public parameters, and time-signals at all the time except the time t. First, they cannot guess at least one coefficient of f (x) with probability larger than 1/q since the degree of f (x) is at most k 2 − 1 as in Shamir's secret sharing scheme [29] . Therefore, they attempt to guess one of a k1 , . . . , a k2−1 by using their k 2 − 1 shares, public parameters and τ − 1 time-signals, since if they obtain any one of these coefficient, they can get f * (P il ) (l = 1, . . . , k 2 i is chosen from F q uniformly at random. Therefore, for any A ∈ PS(P, k 1 , k 2 − 1) and any t ∈ T , we have H(S | U
(t)
A , T I (1) , . . . , T I (t−1) , T I (t+1) , . . . , T I (τ) ) =
H(S ).
Finally, if k 2 − k 1 = , it is straightforward to see that the construction satisfies all the equalities of lower bounds in Theorem 3. Therefore, the above construction is optimal if k 2 − k 1 = .
Extensions
In this section, we discuss the following extensions of our results in the previous sections. Timed-release Secret Sharing with General Access Structures. In Ref. [19] , a generic construction of secret sharing schemes for any general access structure by using threshold secret sharing schemes was proposed, and later such a technique was improved in terms of efficiency on share sizes in Refs. [1] , [32] . We can realize a timed-release secret sharing scheme for any general access structures from (k, n)-TR-SS schemes based on the techniques [1] , [32] . Robust Timed-release Secret Sharing Schemes. Robust secret sharing schemes [11] , [15] , [20] , [26] are secret sharing schemes secure against malicious modification of shares. Technically, suppose that at most ω (< n/2) participants are allowed to modify their own shares so that a reconstructor recovers a secret s , which is different from the original secret s, from all n shares. Then, the secret sharing scheme is said to be (ω, δ)-robust if the success probability of the attack is at most δ. We can construct a (ω, δ)-robust TR-SS scheme by using (ω + 1, n)-TR-SS schemes via two existing approaches: (1) the Rabin-Ben-Or (RB) approach [11] , [26] ; and (2) the Cramer-Damgård-Fehr (CDF) approach [15] , [20] . Since each scheme can be easily constructed and security of each scheme can be proved by a slight modification to the original proof, we here briefly explain the two approaches below.
(1) The RB approach: We can construct a (ω, δ)-robust TR-SS scheme from a (ω + 1, n)-TR-SS scheme and an informationtheoretically secure authentication code (A-code for short) [30] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we showed how we realized informationtheoretically secure secret sharing schemes with timed-release security. Specifically, we considered two schemes, a (k, n)-TR-SS scheme and a (k 1 , k 2 , n)-TR-SS scheme. In the former, at least k participants can reconstruct a secret only with a time-signal at the specified time. In the latter, at least k 2 participants can reconstruct a secret from only their shares as in the traditional secret sharing scheme, whereas at least k 1 (but less than k 2 ) participants can reconstruct a secret only with a time-signal at the specified time. We gave mathematical models and security definitions of both schemes, derived lower bounds on sizes of shares, time-signals, and secret keys required for both schemes. Moreover, we proposed optimal constructions of both schemes, and discussed the extensions of TR-SS schemes.
